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A Partnership A t Risk
By Simon Serfaty
It is no secret that the transatlantic partnership is at risk. Admittedly, this condition may seem neither new nor unusual. Ever since the United States 
assumed, on behalf of the West, a leadership 
it had earned the old-fashioned way—one 
war at a time— its main European part­
ners have questioned its goals, methods, 
and even its values. Similarly, ever since 
the states of postwar Europe began their 
mutation into a European Union (eu), their 
ultimate goals, singular methods, and even 
some of their values have been cause for 
concern or occasional hostility, not just am­
bivalence, in the United States—one presi­
dent and one issue at a time.
Yet, for both the United States and the 
states of Europe, the crisis is different this 
time—certainly critical, difficult to contain, 
and possibly existential.
The difference can be explained in many 
ways. For one, the crisis is unusually com­
plete, as it combines a full range of over­
lapping strategic, economic, and political 
issues that involve the eu and nato as well 
as each of their thirty-five members. These 
issues transcend the personalities of their 
leaders or the specificities of any one state’s
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policy. Even absent Donald Trump, Brexit 
settled, and Vladimir Putin gone, the eu 
and nato, the two main institutional pil­
lars of the transatlantic partnership, would 
face a consequential agenda: engaging Rus­
sia, managing the Greater Middle East, re­
sponding to China, controlling the spread 
of nuclear weapons, ending the wars of 
9/11, sustaining a rules-based commercial 
order, addressing the urgency of climate 
change, sharing the impact of a growing 
migrant crisis, regulating the cyber anar­
chy, digging out of massive imbalances, 
and more. These highly complex issues are 
the known knowns of the post-war, post­
secular, and post-national agendas of the 
decade ahead. For many of these issues, 
the long term is running out of time. This 
is a time for more unity, not less— if not 
now, when? As Angela Merkel poignantly 
reminded Harvard’s new graduates in May 
2019, “Anything that seems set in stone or 
inalterable can indeed change,” whether for 
better or for worse.
In short, on both sides of the Atlantic, 
this is an hour of maximum danger. That 
is what this moment is all about—a shared 
risk that it might turn into an era of irre­
versible ruptures.
A  singular dimension of the m o­ment is also the fact that a principal Western driver of history’s U-turn is 
the president of the United States, now fac­
ing a protracted campaign for re-election. 
A short year before his blind date with our
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future, the only outcome known for sure is 
that the election will be pivotal— arguably 
no less than in 1948 with Truman’s un­
expected victory or in 1980 with Carter’s 
expected defeat. It’s the voters, stupid: since 
1992, the election has been won against the 
pundits’ logical favorite and the prevailing 
poll du jour: Bill Clinton over Bush H.W. 
Bush, George W. Bush over A1 Gore, Barack 
Obama over Hillary Clinton (for the Dem­
ocratic nomination), and Donald Trump 
over Clinton.
But, even while awaiting the people’s final 
verdict, this is not the moment for a time 
out. During this electoral year, it will be the 
allies’ turn to lead from behind. Doing so 
will require adhering to three basic principles.
First, don’t indulge but don’t provoke. 
The Trump narrative about the world is
four-dimensional: The world took advan­
tage— enough! The elite misled— down! 
The Deep State rules— out! Take America 
back— first again! However primitive the 
narrative may be, it sells well— and not 
only in the United States, where it seems 
to work even better when openly confron­
tational and explicitly personal. Make no 
mistake: expect no growth from Trump 
in 2020, only regression. As he makes for­
eign policy the continuation of electoral 
politics by other means, no one can tell 
what looms ahead: more tariff war with 
China, but also with Europe and others 
perhaps; a flawed deal with the like of 
North Korea; a real war with the like of 
Iran; or whatever else might seem politi­
cally expedient, however strategically inco­
herent or dangerous.
Image: President Donald Trump acknowledges a guest during a signing ceremony in Washington, DC. Reuters/Leah 
Millis.
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In such a period, it will be best for the 
states of Europe to avoid confrontation: 
don’t indulge but don’t provoke a U.S. pres­
ident who finds in any slight an offense, any 
offense a provocation, and any provocation 
an opportunity for a provocative rebuke. 
Thus, after Brexit, the best way to respond 
to Trump’s anti-EU strategy is to let it self- 
destruct, one failed deal and disruptive 
tweet at a time. The improbable promise 
of a bilateral trade agreement with Britain 
on the quick is one example, with its pre­
dictably disappointing, and even humiliat­
ing, one-way terms, the likely congressional 
stall prior to a hypothetical ratification, and 
even the tweeted afterthoughts. Trump’s 
self-serving inconsistency on 
the way to a deal does not end 
after the deal has been signed, 
which is why signing once the 
talking ends is not always the 
best option.
Second, th ink small and 
go short. W hether Trump 
ever really mastered “the art 
of the deal” can be argued 
one bankruptcy at a time.
But however that argument 
goes, what was mastered, if 
anything, is the “big” deal.
Ignored are the small deals 
which diplomacy requires for a balanced 
and durable agreement. For there, in the 
realm of les grandes affaires, the pursuit 
of an everything-for-everything, now-or- 
never deal is a non-starter— as shown with 
the lack of progress in pursuing North 
Korea’s denuclearization, or Iran’s non­
nuclearization, “the best deal of the cen­
tury” in the Middle East, and so forth.
And yet, even while some of these crises 
threaten to erupt into proverbial “Octo­
ber surprises,” the European allies can help 
stay the course to avoid dangerous dead 
ends while the electoral clock runs out. The 
role varies— mediator, umpire, point guard,
pivot, or just bench player— but however 
Europe plays it, it can be quite effective: 
“deconflictionary” when matters threaten 
to get out of hand, and “representational” 
when America’s absence threatens to leave 
the West out. Remember the Anglo-French 
role in Georgia in the fall of 2008, or the 
eu Big Three’s role to launch U.S.-Iranian 
negotiations a few years later and, more re­
cently, the French attempt to re-start a dia­
logue with Iran pending broader talks later. 
Going short and thinking small is to find 
and share a way—one issue at a time, one 
step at a time, during a year of great geopo­
litical turbulence— towards a compromise.
Third, step up and dig out. No strate­
gic black hole is deeper, wider, 
and darker than the Middle 
East. As the subtle geopoliti­
cal thinker and baseball-great 
Yogi Berra would have said, 
the region is now half about 
the Arab-Israeli conflict, half 
about Arab-Arab conflicts, 
and the remaining half about 
great and small power con­
flicts. That leaves plenty of 
room for everyone to meddle 
and do harm.
For many years, and preced­
ing Trump, the road to a two- 
state solution has been closed for major 
repair amidst growing doubts about U.S. 
reliability as an honest broker. The result­
ing vacuum surprisingly restores Europe’s 
position as a main Western rampart against 
the unwanted ascendancy of self-styled su­
perpowers like Russia, the destructive in­
competence of regional bullies like Saudi 
Arabia, the dangerous provocations of revo­
lutionary powers like Iran, and even, of late, 
the ineffective assertiveness of newly revi­
sionist powers like Turkey. That the United 
States is not doing well should not be an 
alibi for the states of Europe to do less: lack­
ing the will to assert itself as a power in the
Make no mistake: 
expect no growth 
from  Trump in 2020, 
only regression. As he 
makes foreign policy 
the continuation o f  
electoral politics by 
other means, no one 
can tell what looms 
ahead.
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Middle East and bring it the diplomacy it 
has been lacking in recent years, the risk 
for Europe is that regional instabilities will 
continue to spill over dangerously across the 
Mediterranean.
I n 2016, Trump’s candidacy was severely underestimated, thereby enabling one of the least suited candidates for the 
U.S. presidency ever to defeat one of the 
best prepared ever. At the present moment 
though, nearly every available indicator 
points to a one-term limit for the Trump 
presidency, notwithstanding a statistically 
robust economy. Assuming the time to be 
half past Trump, what can be expected next?
Throughout the Cold War and since, 
every U.S. president has been introduced 
in opposition to his predecessor. In most 
cases, there was no new beginning, however, 
and the expected changes remained short 
of what had been announced. With Trump 
making his predecessor the anti-model he 
did not want to be or become, there has 
been seemingly little of that past continu­
ity. And yet, don’t expect wholesale chang­
es from a new administration. Many of 
Trump’s priorities are likely to endure past 
his time— getting tough on China, being 
more demanding on trade, pursuing nego­
tiations with North Korea, saying “no” to 
a nuclear Iran, seeking a deal over Ukraine 
as part of a detente with Putin’s Russia, in­
cluding a new nuclear balance a trois with 
China, and so forth.
Admittedly, it is premature to anticipate 
how that legacy will be handled specifically, 
pending more clarity on Trump’s successor. 
But it is not too early to assume that a key 
priority of the next U.S. administration will 
be to restore the credibility of its alliance 
relationships with a transatlantic relance 
that should respond to three broad strategic 
guidelines.
First, tell Europe it is wanted—one na­
tional capital at a time and as a Union.
Conversely, the United States must also be 
told it is needed—not only for what it does 
but also for who it is. On both sides of the 
Atlantic, in the United States and Europe, 
an emotional reset is sorely needed.
Soon after the election, the new president 
should formally reassert America’s unequiv­
ocal commitment to an ever closer and 
more capable Europe, as well as a stronger 
and ever more cohesive n a to . There can 
be no ambiguity: the eu  and nato are very 
important U.S. interests, if for no other 
reason that they are vital interests for its 
members, America’s allies of choice. If not 
Europe as a Union, how; if not the eu  with 
NATO, with whom?
To share that certainty across the Atlantic 
and elsewhere, the U.S. president should 
make the Euro-Atlantic institutions in Brus­
sels the first stop of an early trip to Europe, 
as George W. Bush did in February 2005, 
then the earliest such trip after a presidential 
election. The goal would be to explain and 
discuss how the new administration intends 
to redress existing grievances and address the 
agenda inherited from the past years.
More specifically, and compatible with 
the positions adopted by most current 
democratic candidates, the new president 
should quickly announce his or her inten­
tion to restore the pre-Trump consensus on 
three issues of immediate significance: to 
re-embrace the 2015 Joint Comprehensive 
Plan of Action, with the expectation of a 
broader round of multilateral negotiations 
with Iran; a return to the Paris Treaty on 
Climate Change, with shared goals of further 
progress in many of its specific dimensions; 
and to negotiate a Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Pact for completion and eventual 
ratification at the earliest possible date.
Second, relaunch a community of over­
lapping interests, shared goals, and com­
patible values into a balanced and capable 
Euro-Atlantic community of complemen­
tary action.
2 4  The National Interest A  Partnership A t  Risk
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The strategic vision improvised by Harry 
Truman after 1945 was neither Ameri­
can nor European. It was a Western strat­
egy for a new transatlantic order in which 
America’s European identity was reset and 
Europe’s geography recast, with defeated 
Germany in and Soviet Russia out. Thirty 
years after these goals were met during the 
Reagan-Bush three-term co-presidency, no 
new vision is needed. But the goals need 
to be adapted— keep the United States in, 
move the eu up, and inch Russia closer. As 
was the case with Truman, America’s alli­
ance policy does not end in Europe— but it 
does begin there.
On both sides of the Atlantic, the strate­
gic road map for the 2020s demands more 
from the eu and its members, and more 
from nato and its members, including the 
United States. A new balance between and 
within both institutions is imperative, but
neither can be nor ever become sufficient 
because both are necessary for the “smart” 
use of their members’ complementary 
power. For Europe, a mere return to its pe­
rennial institutional debates will not move 
the partnership beyond America’s “me, Tar- 
zan” dialoguing with “you, Jane.” Unless 
the capability gaps across the Atlantic are 
reduced, defense cooperation will become 
increasingly difficult, and the security part­
nership will cease to be operational and, 
therefore, relevant.
“ Qui fa it  quoi,” then-French president 
Jacques Chirac used to ask. To help address 
this question, a new transatlantic agenda 
is long overdue to account for the com­
prehensive changes of the past twenty-five 
years. To assume a role commensurate with 
its interests and capabilities, the eu and its 
members should be prepared to lead on 
issues which they are especially well-suited
Image: A  general view shows the hemicycle during a plenary session o f  the European Parliament in Brussels, Belgium.
Reuters!Francois Lenoir.
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to address historically and geographically. 
Admittedly, much can happen in 2020. But 
with each crisis showing an increasingly 
short fuse, the case for more eu leadership 
grows stronger. For a new beginning with 
Iran, alongside the new U.S. administra­
tion, but also for new diplomatic openings 
with countries whose regimes gambled on 
Trump and will find it necessary to adjust 
accordingly. In Eastern Europe, a geopoliti­
cal reset with Russia, a country faced with a 
sputtering economy and a weary leadership, 
making it ripe for a liquidation of its costly 
security portfolio— including Ukraine— 
and, eventually, a smaller, post-Putin grand 
bargain with the Trump-less 
West. And a reset too with 
China, another country with 
an economy struggling to 
keep pace, but also increas­
ingly aware of a security en­
vironment that is arguably 
the world’s second most dan-
Foreign and security 
policy begins a t home, 
and both the United
Trump and Brexit years: while the latter is 
still exposing the costs of exiting the eu, the 
former has shown the added pains of living 
without allies.
There should be no doubt: absent 
Britain, the eu is weaker— geographical­
ly amputated, historically crippled, and 
politically betrayed. But the reverse is also 
true—just wait and watch. End the bick­
ering, therefore: the eu and a few of its 
members are powers in the world, just like 
Britain is and will remain even after its 
exit. But lacking bulk, capabilities, and 
will, none can be a world power without 
the others— European countries in need 
of their Union, the Union 
in need of Britain, Britain 
in need of a Union, and 
the United States in need 
of both as its most willing,
States and Europe need capable, and compatible al­
lies. Don’t count on any one,
to p u t their respective
gerous.
And third, post-Brexit, Brit­
ain will remain a vital eu part­
ner. And however the Brexit trends ofthe past thirty 
transition evolves, the reset of
houses in order. Forget 
Trump and Brexit— the
eu-uk relations is strategically 
essential to a balanced transat­
lantic partnership.
Foreign and security policy 
begins at home, and both the United States 
and Europe need to put their respective 
houses in order. Forget Trump and Brexit— 
the trends of the past thirty years have not 
been good on either side of the Atlantic. 
There has been too much politics and not 
enough policy in the national capitals, but 
also too much policy and not enough ef­
ficiency out of the institutions. Likewise, 
there has been too much ambition and not 
enough conviction from the top down, 
but too much resentment and not enough 
time from the bottom up. Yet, there is an 
internal upside to the turbulence of the
years have not been 
good on either side o f  
the Atlantic.
two, or three post-Brexit eu 
powers to compensate for 
the loss of Britain.
As the dust settles into the 
2020s, it will be important 
for both sides of the Chan­
nel to agree on the terms of 
their mutual interdependence 
in ways that also satisfy both 
sides of the Atlantic. The sad 
fact is that there is only one thing the United 
Kingdom alone can do for the United States 
better and faster than the eu, and that is to 
say “Yes” when asked by Washington, with 
little comparable in return except “Get lost.” 
Call it Britain’s Mexican option. Post-Brexit, 
direct institutional and operational links with 
the eu across the board should grant the 
United Kingdom a presence and an influence 
compatible with its ability to contribute to 
the eu’s ability to act—no longer a member, 
to be sure, but a non-member member whose 
privileges and obligations continue to be sig­
nificant and potentially indispensable.
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W hile political theory and elec­toral arithmetic point to a likely defeat of the incumbent presi­
dent in November 2020, recent history and 
electoral geography point to forecasts that 
failed to account for Trump’s uncanny abil­
ity to defeat the odds as he did in 2016— 
the “what if” that was broadly overlooked 
during the past four presidential elections 
in the United States, as well as for the June 
2016 referendum in the United Kingdom.
It is during their second term in office 
that U.S. presidents find their way into his­
tory, for the better (Harry Truman, Ronald 
Reagan, and George W. Bush) or for the 
worse (Dwight Eisenhower, Lyndon John­
son, and Bill Clinton). Barack Obama was a 
special case: his election alone made history, 
for which he was awarded a Nobel Peace 
Prize which should have gone to the Ameri­
can Union. As to one-term presidents like 
Jimmy Carter and George H.W. Bush, they 
have been cast primarily as caretakers—the 
latter for giving Reagan a virtual third term, 
and the former for giving his country the 
timeout it needed after Nixon.
Don’t expect that much from a second 
Trump term. As the former uk ambassador 
Sir Kim Darroch stated upon leaving his 
post in Washington, the U.S. president will 
not “become substantially more normal, 
less dysfunctional, less unpredictable, less 
faction riven, less diplomatically clumsy 
and inept.” W ith his 2016 electoral tri­
umph confirmed in 2020 after a scorched- 
earth political battle over impeachment, 
Trump would be fully unleashed— more 
personal and confrontational, more unpre­
dictable and unreliable, angrier and more 
vengeful. But he would also be more un­
filtered and insulated and, therefore, more 
impulsive and freer of any constraints. He 
will stand permanently at the edge of a 
constitutional confrontation but comfort­
ed by an obedient Republican Party (likely 
to be still in control of at least the Senate)
and protected by “his” Supreme Court, 
poised to gain as many as two more con­
servative Justices.
These thoughts are not reassuring. In 
2016, Americans did not get the president 
they hoped for and deserved: too much 
controversy surrounded his election. Yet the 
world may have gotten what it deserved, 
including the adversaries who cheated too 
much and even the allies who are said to 
do too little. With a Trump reelection in 
2020, however, the roles would be reversed: 
Americans who vote for a second mandate 
would get the president they want and thus 
deserve. But Europe and even the world 
would receive more than they can possibly 
manage, including a populist brand name 
which will be aggressively promoted at the 
expense of national leaders the U.S. presi­
dent might not like, not to mention a more 
confrontational approach with states and 
governments that denied him the economic 
and nuclear deals he had hoped to con­
clude during his first term. Thus, moving 
hypothetically into Trump’s second presi­
dential term, there are a few priorities to be 
adopted in such a scenario.
First, let Europe be Europe: as an ever 
closer and stronger Union whose members 
think, speak, and act European.
There is more to the making of Europe 
than the United States, and other U.S. pres­
idents have questioned the idea of a united 
Europe, although not to the point of de­
claring the eu “a foe” and NATO “obsolete” 
and “brain dead.” A second four-year term 
for Trump would be extremely consequen­
tial for the military alliance, and everyone 
should plan accordingly.
Less nato calls for more e u , not as a 
matter of choice but as a matter of ne­
cessity. This is not a new condition, as 
has been seen often since the 1956 Suez 
Crisis shaped the ratification debates of the 
Rome Treaties. To each transatlantic crisis 
its relance and for each relance its crisis.
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Admittedly, there is enough ambivalence 
and confusion about eu institutions to end 
this pattern— across the continent, across 
the channel, and across the Atlantic. But 
post-Trump, post-Brexit, and closing on 
post-Putin (but not post-Russia), there is 
an opportunity for eu members and the 
growing peloton of Euroskeptics to come 
to their senses. For while the idea of Europe 
has lost much of its past clarity and efficacy, 
it has lost none of its relevance and has re­
gained much of its urgency. For those who 
have failed to notice, Brexit confirms that 
there is no credible plan B, for the states of 
Europe relative to the Union, but also for 
the United States relative to 
its alliance.
Without a doubt, Trump’s second presi­
dential term would be stressful. It would 
test Europe’s will and America’s capaci­
ty to salvage whatever it can of the rela­
tionship. Intent on his divisive anti-EU 
strategy, Trump would promote the decep­
tive benefits of privileged trade relations 
with other eu exiters-to-be in Eastern and 
Southern Europe while seeking congres­
sional approval of a trade agreement pos­
sibly signed with Britain prior to or shortly 
after his re-election. Tariffs would remain 
a weapon of choice, aimed at adversar­
ies and allies alike, and with more con­
sequences on intra-European and global 
trade patterns— threatening
As Europe struggles to a dangerous “de-integration”
Second, as Europe strug- ^  Europe, it  must also W° rld’S eC° n0my'
gles to be Europe, it must r  ticipate, too, an interest in
also learn how to let Trump leam how to let Trump a phase-out from NATO by a 
be Trump, and America be Jru m p >  and America date TrumP w0^ld want. t0
America. A limited liability 
partnership can do— still in­
tent on U.S.-EU cooperation 
and eu-nato complementar­
ity.
Over the past three decades 
more specifically, Bill Clinton 
neglected the defeated state,
Russia, and most of the for­
mer Soviet Republics; George 
W. Bush mismanaged the wars of 9/11, in 
Afghanistan and Iraq; and Barack Obama 
misunderstood the Arab Spring and its con­
sequences without improving his predeces­
sors’ unfinished business. As a result, it is 
not surprising that European states have 
taken to questioning American leadership 
with renewed intensity. But still, there is one 
conclusion at least about which history’s ver­
dict is final: America, Europe, and the world 
are better off when America stays in (1945) 
than when it stays away (1914, 1939), steps 
down (1919) or stands aside (1991). What­
ever the outcome of the next American pres­
idential election, this verdict will still hold.
be America. A limited 
liability partnership 
can do— still intent on 
U .S.-EU  cooperation 
and EU-NATO 
complementarity.
make certain of—meaning 
no later than 2024 for the 
end of his mandate and the 
seventy-fifth anniversary of 
the 1949 Washington Treaty. 
By that time he would have 
completed his long-awaited 
bilateral entente with Putin’s 
Russia back into a reconsti­
tuted G8. As compensation, 
closer bilateral security relations hors NATO 
might be offered to some countries in Eu­
rope, in but also hors eu . In short, a new 
geopolitical map for Europe would begin 
to emerge, closer to what is remembered of 
the nineteenth century but hardly compat­
ible with what had been expected for the 
twenty-first—sanctions-driven rather than 
rules-based, lacking moral clarity, and with 
little strategic consistency.
And yet... patience, patience— there is 
more to America than Trump and less to 
Trump than America. There would remain 
much room for cooperation in a second 
Trump term on issues of shared interest to
Image: Russian president Vladimir Putin chairs a meeting with members o f  the Security Council at the Novo-Ogaryovo 
state residence outside Moscow, Russia. Sputnik/Mikhail Klimentyev!Kremlin.
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the eu and nato countries— even when 
these interests are not evenly shared and 
responsibility for those interests not evenly 
assumed by both institutions and all of their 
members.
Third, don’t let Russia be Russia, and 
Putin, Putin: an integrated Ostpolitik that 
involves nato, the eu, and their thirty-five 
members is needed.
This is not about Putin because of Rus­
sia with and in spite of Trump, but about 
Russia with and in spite of Putin. Always 
a rival, this complex but also complexed 
power resists the idea of having just foreign 
countries in its vicinity— they can only be 
either vassals or enemies. Strategic prudence 
is how the Cold War was won, with quite 
a few compromises along the way. W ith 
Europe still the strategic centerpiece of its 
imperial envies, more prudence— meaning 
also more patience—is needed.
Looking already beyond the end of his 
current mandate in 2024, Putin is not
merely an opportunist and an improvis­
er: he is also a strategist and a survivor. 
He chooses his time to pick his fights, but 
when he does he is prepared to fight the 
time-tested Russian way: hard, long, and 
dirty. Don’t wait for him, therefore, to 
change course without trying to preserve or 
add to previous gains. In Eastern Europe, 
including Ukraine, but also in regions less 
known to Russia like the Middle East, Putin 
manipulates facts and fiction— weapons 
he does not have, money he cannot spend, 
allies he cannot get, or time he is lacking. 
But better than most, Putin can separate the 
fiction he creates from the facts he knows, 
which keeps him open to negotiations after 
he has shown his resolve— don’t indulge 
and don’t provoke but do engage. For in the 
end, history tells us that Russia’s attempts 
to go global neither last long nor end well, 
and as an exhausted post-Soviet Russia runs 
out of resources, people, capabilities, and 
even security space, it will run out of time.
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At this point, turning to the West will come 
naturally— echoes of Gorbachev’s strategic 
dead end after Brezhnev’s final attempt to 
challenge the United States for primacy in 
Europe and for influence in the world.
Fourth, don’t give China a pass, a strate­
gic reset is needed.
Expectations of a quick transformation 
of a prosperous China into a constructive 
partner were exaggerated. Feared in Europe, 
which has forever anticipated a U.S. pivot 
to Asia, this early experience of economic 
collusion between the United States and 
China now comes with fears of a collision 
between them. At issue, then, is not an 
overdue economic and military reset with 
China, but whether the unilateral and im­
provised methods used to-date are threaten­
ing to open a quagmire for all.
Idegemonic upgrades do not 
come easily— just ask Imperial 
Germany and Japan about their 
own bids for power in 1919 and
capabilities and technological advances rela­
tive to the United States are doubtful and 
in need of confirmation over time—echoes 
of the misleading projections of Soviet eco­
nomic growth in the 1950s and emerging 
strategic superiority in the 1970s. At issue 
is not the rise of China to shared primacy 
but a reminder of the obstacles along the 
way. In short, China is a power in the world 
but it is not yet a world power; and even as 
the foremost power in Asia, it is not Asia’s 
partner of choice. While the behavior of a 
rising power cannot be predicted, increas­
ingly tumultuous relations with China will 
be handled best if the United States and 
Europe act jointly as powers in Asia, though 
not Asian powers.
we are left with a few assumptions aboutan incomplete and 
unfinished Europe, still the stra­
tegic priority of a revanchist Rus-
Hegemonic 
upgrades do not 
come easily—
1941, and check with Soviet Rus- ju st ask Imperial sia; in an unbalanced Asia, where 
sia in 1991 too. Timing is ev- ^  , an ascending China stands as
erything, but don’t overlook the ermany an ^  most serjous new bidder for 
need for sustainable capabilities Japan. global hegemony; and in the piv-
and competence. Take the United otal Greater Middle East, where
States of America: what made its rise to he- the rise of Iran serves the ambitions of
gemony especially effective is that its leaders 
took their time while building up their re­
sources and gaining experience.
Whether China will do as well during the 
coming decade is, at best, unclear. Indeed, 
both its capabilities and competence may be 
exaggerated. Consider its economic miracle: 
according to researchers at the Chinese Uni­
versity of Hong Kong and the University of 
Chicago, annual growth has been overstated 
by an average of 1.7 percentage points for 
at least nine years (2008-2016), leaving 
the nominal size of the economy at about 
eighteen percent lower than its official 
level of $13.4 trillion at the end of 2018. 
Other statistical claims of strategic parity or 
even superiority extend to China’s military
eager newcomers like Russia and tradition­
al bystanders like Saudi Arabia. This is not 
an agenda imposed by Trump on America, 
by America on Europe, and by the West on 
the world, but one imposed by the world 
on all.
First, the transatlantic partnership is and 
will remain vital for any sort of rules-based 
order to emerge over the next decade. Yes, 
America’s leadership has been fading pre- 
and post-Trump. But even so, the United 
States and Europe are indispensable part­
ners which remain united by the interests 
and values they share with each other more 
evenly than with others. Alternatives— like 
a so-called “Anglosphere” of democratic 
states, or an allegedly European “Europe”
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stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals, or 
a geostrategic pivot to a Pacific pas de qrntre 
choreographed by the United States with 
Australia, Japan, and India—lack the com­
patibilities and complementarities of the 
Euro-Atlantic co-partnership.
Second, the United States is preponder­
ant in most dimensions of power— the 
world’s most complete power. For allies and 
adversaries alike, the facts of its power are 
not questioned— only how it is employed 
and why. However, for Europe to be a ca­
pable counterpart with enough capacity 
to act, even as a counterweight, its Union 
needs to be extended in the political arena 
lest it proves to be no better than a counter­
feit. nato cannot be turned into a universal 
social worker any more than the eu can be­
come a global security provider. With each 
institution relying on the other in the areas 
it does least or less well, institutional com­
plementarity is about power and weakness­
es, as America and Europe thus complete 
each other on behalf of shared interests and 
common goals.
Third, com plem entarity of Europe­
an membership in nato and the eu also 
remains desirable. The six countries that 
signed the Rome Treaties were all nato 
members; thirty-five years later, at the end 
of the Cold War, the European member­
ship of nato (then fifteen) and the eu (then 
twelve) was nearly identical. Enlargement 
since then has affected both institutions 
almost evenly, with only two of the thirteen 
new nato members and five of the sixteen 
new eu members not becoming members 
of the other institution. Post-Brexit but also 
with reference to Turkey, this convergence 
now looks beyond reach. To avoid more 
separation, consultation between the total 
thirty-five members of eu (now twenty- 
eight) and nato (now twenty-nine, includ­
ing twenty-one European countries) should 
be reinforced to ease Euro-Atlantic consul­
tation before decisions are made by or for 
either institution, thus making them all 
partners of choice for joint or complemen­
tary action by either institution to which 
they do not or cannot belong.
Image: The U.S. flag lies in front o f  the Capitol dome in Washington, DC. Reuters/Joshua Roberts
A  Partnership A t Risk March/April 2020 31
i     
 uatre 
graphed it d c tes  
-lack -
ti ilities  le entarit es  
ti   
it  nder-
t st ensions  er-
' lete   
  
t ti ned-onl  
.  -
l  nterpart it  gh 
 
 
    t r-
NATO t   
  EU -
t  
t tion   
 ti al -
t rity t -
    l
c l   
 l . 
ird, plementarit  rope-
ers NATO  EU 
i s  tries c
i    i  NATO 
 , 
  ean -
NATO  EU
t  t 
  t   titutions 
ly    
NATO   
EU  i   
 ti .   
   chis 
  
ti , ltation 
t t -five rs  EU  t
i NiITO , -
  
!be   -
 dsions 
it er titution,  i g  
 t -
t   r titution  
 t  
I ge:  . . f s t f l  hington, . ters/Jo  erts 
rtner i    rch/April  
Fourth, the rise of China as a superpower 
is nearly certain, whatever its place in a re­
gion with little settled history and five nu­
clear powers— including two of them that 
are highly unstable and potential first users. 
Unlike the Soviet Union, which could not 
match, let alone surpass, America’s supe­
riority, China can, although the road is 
getting bumpier and the risks of a hard 
landing real— with falling growth, grow­
ing regional challenges, and little adapt­
ability. As was shown by Reagan after three 
decades of global rivalry with the Soviet 
Union, strategic restraint has its limits and 
hegemonic expansion faces diminishing 
returns. Seven decades after the West alleg­
edly “lost” China, it is now China which 
is “losing” the West, as a broad consensus 
posits that a less strong and even less united 
China may be a better fit after all.
Fifth, the Cold War is won and gone, but 
Russia is neither done nor defeated. For 
the Russky M ir— the Russian world that 
comprises parts of Kazakhstan and sizeable 
populations in the Baltic States—there is no 
modest vision of a natural sphere of influ­
ence over its neighbors. Now, only a short
quarter of a century after its most recent 
defeat, Russia acts like it won the Cold War, 
as it calls for nato to be disbanded and the 
eu to be neutered while blatantly interven­
ing in their members’ national elections and 
spreading new instabilities in areas of vital 
interest to them. Yet, faced with bad geopo­
litical conditions all around, economically 
vulnerable, and with few capable friends, 
Russia is a demandeur state whose future 
is with but not in the West, including the 
United States and Europe, and neither in 
nor with Asia, including China.
Sixth, the Greater Middle East is more 
fragmented, hostile, dangerous, and unpre­
dictable than ever before. The territorial ar­
rangements made at the expense of the Otto­
man Empire one hundred years ago are void 
and opened to the highest bidders. Gone, 
too, are the few days of interstate wars be­
tween Israel and its Arab neighbors to which 
the region grew accustomed— the kind of 
wars Israel could win on the cheap, America 
end on the quick, and Europe watch from 
a distance while non-Western states were 
kept away. What is left are the kinds of end­
less wars we lose or just cannot win—with
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a potential for bigger and worse wars than 
any in the past. During the Cold War, the 
statistic that best described the deepening 
U.S. involvement in the Middle East was 
zero—zero military casualties up to 1983 (in 
Beirut, Lebanon) and zero regime change in­
tervention after 1953 (in Iran), but also zero 
effectiveness in ending the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict and zero results in enhancing human 
rights. Now, even Yogi Berra’s arithmetic 
cannot measure the current moral and strate­
gic confusion. With the region broken into a 
multitude of territorial and sectarian pieces, 
and absent a local will to fix it or even agree 
over what needs fixing first, there is little the 
United States and Europe can fix alone and 
on the quick, if anything.
Seventh, the entire Greater Middle East 
stands where Europe was during the past 
century: there can be no order in the world 
without some order in the region. Turkey, 
which “lost” the region to an imperial West 
in 1916, and the imperious rise of Iran, 
which hopes to regain the region on behalf of 
its own brand of Islam, are special challenges 
which neither the United States nor Europe 
can escape. For the former, the West is losing 
its appeal, and even while Turkey remains 
fit for nato because of its military capabili­
ties, nato itself is not because of the alliance 
handicaps it brings. And even if the eu  suits 
Turkey because of the economic advantages it 
offers, Turkey does not because of its demo­
cratic deficits. Don’t make of Turkey an or­
phan, though: nato must give it the strategic 
respect it deserves for its contributions and 
the eu  the economic partner it needs for its 
secular democracy to endure.
Eight, with regard to Iran, the post-1979 
tensions are just about to run out of time. 
As an increasingly defiant regime shows a 
predilection for war with the United States 
over the “maximum” economic pressures 
imposed since Trump withdrew from the 
2015 nuclear deal; and as Israel—and possi­
bly the United States too—confirms its own
preference for a war with Iran over a nuclear 
Iran, this is the most immediate threat in 
the region, with a potential for a serious 
military clash matched nowhere else. Make 
no mistake: however and whenever a war 
starts with Iran, unless it is ended quickly, 
the horrific risk is to have it end into a cata­
strophic nuclear escalation.
Ninth, wild cards and small events, by def­
inition unknown and unpredictable, demon­
strate best the need for transatlantic strategic 
interdependence. There are numerous press­
ing concerns: terrorism, economic instability, 
populist uprisings, rapidly developing tech­
nological changes, and more. With all these 
issues moving at variable speeds and in op­
posite directions, no power alone, however 
peerless, can stay on top for long without 
capable allies. And no single dimension of 
power, however superior, can suffice to re­
solve any one issue, however significant.
Tenth, in a moment infused with a cer­
tain air of destiny, divisions between the 
United States and Europe, as well as among 
the states of Europe, are serious because 
many of these issues are existential. These 
divisions are placing the transatlantic part­
nership in jeopardy at a time when unity is 
essential— not because, absent their alliance, 
the United States and Europe would be de­
nied a future, but because that future would 
be less promising, more dangerous, and less 
comfortable. Post-Trump and post-Brexit, 
then, let’s be sure to undo the damage done 
to the eu  and nato . A s Winston Churchill 
reflected in 1919, many futures ago, “The 
true nature of nations is what they do when 
they are tired.” Our Western democracies 
have rarely been as tired as they are now. 
But whatever their reasons, this is no time 
for them to walk away from the achieve­
ments of the past seventy years, including 
a Western alliance that defeated history in 
Europe and kept the West firmly in place 
elsewhere. It won’t require thaumaturgy to 
revive it, but practical accomplishments. □
Image: People hold their mobile phones and Chinese flags as military aircraft fly  in formation during the military 
parade marking the seventieth founding anniversary o f  Peoples Republic o f  China. Reuters/Tingshu Wang.
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